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I. INTRODUCTION
There are several reasons why fiscal outcomes may deviate from plans. First, the macroeconomic scenario may unfold differently from that foreseen in the plan (Frankel, 2011) . Second, the design of fiscal rules may be such that their adherence requires fiscal discipline in terms of plans but not in terms of outcomes. Finally, policy makers may find it difficult to implement fiscal plans because of opposition from vested interest groups others, 2009 and Von Hagen, 2010) . In fact, political factors can be particularly important in explaining fiscal outcomes when elections are approaching and/or if political fragmentation is large (Perotti, 1998; Von Hagen, Hallet and Strauch, 2001; Perotti and Kontopoulus, 2002; Protrafke, 2011) . 2 We label the difference between budget plans and budget implementation as the promise gap. The size of promise gaps has a bearing on credibility and democratic accountability of elected governments. For example, large and systematic fiscal promise gaps may increase uncertainty for economic agents and lower the credibility of the government, thus increasing long-term interest rates on government bonds (World Bank, 2005; Baldacci and Kumar, 2010; Beetsma and others, 2015) . In addition, when governments do not deliver on their promises, the quality of democracy may suffer (Przeworski and others, 1999) . In a fully functioning democracy with rational forwardlooking voters and politicians, the electorate expects governments to be responsive to their economic and fiscal preferences.
In this paper, we study two questions: First, what explains fiscal consolidation promise gaps? Second, what is the reaction of markets and voters to promise gaps incurred by incumbent parties? In our view, these two issues are interrelated. Parties in government are motivated by a specific policy agenda and by their willingness to remain in office (Muller and Strom, 1999) 3 . When governments deliver on their promised policies they are likely to be re-elected. If they fall short on these promises, they could be penalized by voters, unless this deviation benefits the electorate in the short-run. At the same time, financial markets monitor these actions and if they see politically-motivated deviations from promised fiscal discipline they react negatively. 2 In addition to elections and political fragmentation, fiscal consolidations could be influenced by the government's ideology. While ideology is not relevant for explaining the size of consolidation promise gaps in our sample, it has been shown to affect the composition of the budget. A number of scholars (Boix, 1997; Franzese, 2002; Mulas-Granados, 2003; Tavares, 2004; Konishi, 2006; Mierau and others, 2007; Angelopoulus and others, 2012) have shown that left-wing governments may prefer revenue-based adjustments to ensure financing for the welfare state, while right-wing governments may opt for expenditurebased ones.
Because these questions are intertwined, we tackled them empirically in two steps. For this purpose, we create a new database of fiscal consolidations that compares narrative budget plans with actual fiscal performance in 17 OECD countries during 1978-2015. 4 We find that fiscal promise gaps were sizeable (about 0.3 percent of GDP per year, or 1.1 percent of GDP over a typical 3-year adjustment episode). Economic factors and forecast errors were important in explaining the differences between budget plans and fiscal outcomes, but political factors also played a role: greater electoral proximity, stronger political cohesion and higher accountability were all associated with smaller promise gaps. Finally, governments which delivered on their promised fiscal consolidation plans were rewarded by financial markets and not penalized by voters.
Our paper makes three contributions to the existing literature: first, it updates the narrative database from Devries and others (2011) and Alesina and others (2015) ; second, it considers simultaneously the role of three political factors (electoral proximity, political strength and institutional accountability) in explaining consolidation promise gaps; and third, it looks at the consequences of promise gaps on market sentiment and governments' popularity among the electorate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the data and the definition of our dependent variable. Section 3 explores the economic and political causes of consolidation promise gaps. Section 4 looks into the reaction of markets and the electorate to these gaps, and the last section concludes and presents policy implications.
II. DEFINING FISCAL PROMISE GAPS

A. Identifying Fiscal Consolidation Episodes
The literature on fiscal adjustment episodes is vast and has for a long time relied on the positive approach, by which fiscal consolidations are associated with large changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB). 5 More recently, scholars have identified consolidation episodes following a narrative approach, which relies on approved budget plans and historical accounts of past fiscal policy. Such approach was first popularized by Romer and Romer (2010) and Devries and others (2011) , who subsequently made publicly available a list of fiscal consolidation episodes for 17 advanced economies 4 For a recent discussion of the alternative ways to identify fiscal consolidations using the narrative and positive approaches, see Afonso and Jalles (2014) and Escolano and others (2014) . 5 Some caveats surrounding traditional CAPB approach have been highlighted recently (see Afonso and Jalles, 2014) . In particular, the CAPB approach could bias empirical estimates towards finding evidence of non-Keynesian effects. Many non-policy factors influence the CAPB and can lead to erroneous conclusions regarding fiscal policy changes. For example, a stock price boom raises the CAPB by increasing capital gains tax revenue, and tends to coincide with an expansion in private demand (Morris and Schuknecht, 2007) . Even when the CAPB accurately measures fiscal actions, these could include discretionary responses to economic developments.
between 1978 and 2009. 6 More recently, Alesina and others (2015) updated that database for a subset of European Countries until 2012. In this paper, we update the database for all the 17 countries included in Devries and others (2011) . We followed the same approach, and relied on historical description surrounding changes in budget deficits every year as recorded in national budget laws, European Commission's Stability and Growth Programs and OECD's country reviews. 7
In our sample we identify 73 episodes of fiscal consolidations. Table 1 summarizes these episodes by country. The number of fiscal contractions per country ranges from two in the cases of Canada or Finland, to seven in France or the United States. The size of fiscal consolidation episodes varies from 0.04 percent of GDP to 4.74 percent of GDP, with an average size of fiscal adjustment equal to 1.06 percent of GDP. The average duration of the reported fiscal episodes is 3.3 years, with the shortest duration corresponding to one year (21 episodes) and the longest duration corresponding to 14 years (Canada). 1985 -88, 1994 -99, 2010 -12, 2014 -15 Austria 1980 -81, 1984 , 1996 -97, 2001 -02, 2011 -12, 2015 Belgium 1982 -85, 1987 , 1990 , 1992 -94, 1996 -97, 2010 -15 Canada 1984 -97, 2010 -15 Denmark 1983 -86, 1995 , 2012 Finland 1992 -97, 2011 France 1979 , 1987 , 1989 , 1991 -92, 1995 -97, 1999 -2000 -15 Germany 1982 -1984 , 1991 -95, 1997 -2000 , 2003 -04, 2006 -07, 2011 -12 Ireland 1982 -88, 2009 -15 Italy 1991 -98, 2004 -07, 2010 -15 Japan 1997 -98, 2003 -07 Netherlands 1981 -88, 1991 -93, 2004 -05, 2011 -13, 2015 Portugal 1983 , 2000 , 2002 -03, 2005 -07, 2010 -15 Spain 1983 -84, 1989 -90, 1992 -97, 2009 -15 Sweden 1984 , 1993 -98, 2011 United Kingdom 1979 -82, 1994 -99, 2010 , 2012 , 2014 -15 United States 1978 , 1980 -81, 1985 -86, 1988 , 1990 -98, 2011 Source: Author's calculations. See Appendix 1 for details.
6
Note that the narrative approach used by Devries and others (2011) uses historical accounts from OECD and EU's annual reports describing what happened to the budget deficit in a particular country/period but they do not go into the details of policy makers' intentions, discussions and congressional records. This differs from the approach used in Romer and Romer (2010) , who identify exogenous tax policy changes by carefully analysing US congressional documents.
7
A description of this update for each country and consolidation year is available in the Appendix 1. Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of fiscal consolidation episodes over time as well as their distribution by size (in percent of GDP). Most episodes took place in the mid-1980s, the late 1990s (led by European countries' need to qualify for the single currency union) and between 2010 and 2015, in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis (following the cross-country coordinated fiscal stimuli that took place). In more than 35 percent of fiscal adjustment episodes, the size was between 0 and 0.5 percent of GDP. Only in 5 percent of cases, the adjustment was larger than 3 percent of GDP. 
B. Measuring Consolidation Promise Gaps
We define consolidation promise gaps (CPG) as the difference between the size of planned fiscal adjustment (PFA), as measured by the narrative approach, and the size of the realized fiscal adjustment (RFA), as measured by changes in the budget balance (all expressed in percent of GDP). 8
CPG = PFA -RFA
The promise gaps can have both signs. Governments can deliver less fiscal adjustment than initially planned (positive promise gap) or they can implement a larger adjustment than initially foreseen (negative promise gap). Using data at the general government level, Figure 3 shows the average size of promise gaps by country. Finland, Spain, Ireland and Italy are the countries with the largest positive promise gaps, while Denmark, the UK, Germany, Canada and Sweden are the countries which managed to deliver on average larger fiscal consolidations than those initially planned.
In Figure 4a , we show the promise gap using the primary balance to correct for the effect of interest
payments. Figure 4b , shows the promise gap using the structural balance which allows us to take into account the effects stemming from the economic cycle (e.g. Finland) and/or one-off measures (e.g. For robustness purposes, we also defined our dependent variable using changes in the cyclically adjusted budget balance or changes in the primary balance and results are qualitatively similar. These are available upon request from the authors.
9
The use of general government data allows us to compare countries with different degrees of fiscal decentralization. In some countries, like Canada or Spain, regional government finances are sizeable and their fiscal accounts are not always correlated with those of central government. Note: "Size" measured in percent of GDP. Yellow dots denote the country-specific maximum; grey dots denote the country-specific minimum.
III. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF CONSOLIDATION PROMISE GAPS
A. Economic Factors: Stylized Facts
In order to explain the size of consolidation promise gaps we look at the role of initial fiscal conditions, such as the initial level of debt-to-GDP ratio and the initial level of fiscal sustainability. 10 We also look at the size of the output gap and at growth forecast errors. 1112 Figure 5 plots average promise gaps for high and low levels of different variables of interest. 13
10
The sustainability factor is defined as difference between the actual primary balance and the debt-stabilizing primary balance (see Escolano and others, 2014 for further details). Higher values of the initial sustainability factor imply that countries have primary balances close to (or above) the debt-stabilizing optimum level, and therefore they are not under fiscal stress.
11
Output gap is calculated as actual minus potential GDP using data from the WEO database.
12
We use the 3, 9, 15 and 21 months GDP forecast errors from WEO database. Forecast errors are defined as the difference between the actual real GDP growth and the forecasted real GDP growth. A large (positive) forecast error implies that GDP grew more than predicted. All forecast error variables yield qualitatively similar results; hence, below we present solely estimates using one, the 9 months ahead variant. 
Size of Promise Gaps and Economic Conditions
Note: Size" measured in percent of GDP. "Initial" refers to the year prior to the start of a given consolidation episode. "High" and "Low" levels are identified by cases above the 75th percentile of the distribution and below the 25th percentile, respectively.
The bar charts show that initially adverse fiscal conditions (high levels of debt and low fiscal sustainability) are subsequently associated with smaller consolidation promise gaps. This is in line with results from Escolano and others (2014) who find that countries under fiscal stress are willing to undertake stronger fiscal adjustments and deliver on their commitments to undertake more sizable consolidations. In addition, Figure 6 shows that adverse economic conditions (as evidenced by large output gaps and high real GDP growth forecast errors) are also associated with smaller consolidation promise gaps.
B. Political Factors: Principal Components Analysis
Several political factors can affect the size of consolidation promise gaps. In fact, the existing literature has mainly focused on the possible role of elections and budget institutions (Beetsma and others, 2009 (Beetsma and others, , 2012 (Beetsma and others, and 2015 and find that these variables are not very statistically significant. In our view, testing a few political variables can suffer from selection bias. We propose instead a more comprehensive analysis of political factors that can potentially affect promise gaps. We focus on 5a. Initial Public Debt 5c. Output Gap three political dimensions (each containing multiple variables) and build political indicators through principal components analysis (PCA). These three political dimensions are detailed as follows: 14  Electoral Proximity: This dimension takes into account the time that policy-makers have before forthcoming elections. Politicians facing coming elections have stronger incentives to deliver on their budget promises and report lower consolidation promise gaps. We use four variables to compute the Proximity PCA. A higher electoral proximity is associated with more years in office, less years left in current term, a party of chief executive with a short tradition in office, and less months to the next election. 15 Only the first principal component is retained. 16  Political Strength: This dimension takes into account the number of political actors participating in budgetary decisions, which typically exhibit conflicting budgetary demands. These actors could be parties in government -or in opposition-, interest groups or, more generally, veto players. Strong governments are those which operate in less fragmented political environments and are likely to be subject to less stringent spending demands. Therefore, they are typically associated with tighter fiscal discipline and lower promise gaps. We use four variables to compute the Strength PCA. More political strength is associated with a high margin of parliamentary majority, low cabinet fragmentation, executive control of all houses, and a weak opposition. Only the first principal component is retained.
 Political Accountability: This dimension takes into account the institutional context in which fiscal policy decisions are made. When politicians operate in contexts where there is more transparency, better governance and more mechanisms to monitor their activities objectively, they tend to be more responsive to citizen's demands and more accountable to voters for the promises they make. In such contexts, politicians operating in institutional contexts with more accountability would be associated with more fiscal discipline and lower promise gaps. We use five variables to compute the Accountability PCA. A higher accountability index is associated with more voice and accountability, with more regulatory quality, more government effectiveness and with the rule of law.
17
Only the first principal component is retained.
14 We also explored, in addition, the role of government ideology but results were inconclusive as more than 2/3 of consolidation episodes were planned and implemented by centrist governments. Results are available from the authors upon request.
15
This latter indicator refers to actual months left to next election, ex-post facto, after the fact, while the variable "more years left in current term" is observed ex-ante. Both are informative.
16
A likelihood ratio (LR) test was used to examine the "sphericity" case, allowing for sampling variability in the correlations. This test comfortably rejects sphericity at the 1 percent level. The first factor explains almost 40 percent of the variance in the standardized data (see Table 3 ).
Proximity and Strength variables are each represented by one factor composed of four underlying variables. 18 Accountability is represented by one factor composed of five underlying variables. 19 The resulting principal components indices are described in Table 2, while Table 3 lists the corresponding factor loadings. 20 We can interpret the principal components by focusing on the factor loadings and the uniqueness of each variable. 21 As regards political Proximity, uniqueness is relatively low for all variables, which implies that the factor retained spans the original variables adequately. As to political Strength, the factor appears to describe mostly the margin of majority and cabinet strength. In principle, both factors should enter with positive coefficients in the regressions. Finally, with respect to Accountability, the factor is mainly driven by the role of government effectiveness. Figure 6 plots the average size of consolidation promise gaps for low and high levels of the three principal component indicators along the three dimensions associated with Proximity, Strength and Accountability. As expected, political strength and high institutional accountability are associated with lower consolidation promise gaps. Moreover, the higher the electoral proximity the higher the
18
The sources for each component variable is the Database on Political Institutions 2015 (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini, 2015) .
19
The sources for each component variable is the World Bank's Governance Indicators.
20
PCA is based on the classical covariance matrix, which is sensitive to outliers. Here we conduct a robust estimation of the covariance matrix. A well suited method is the Minimum Covariance Determinant (MCD) that considers all subsets containing h % of the observations and estimates the variance of the mean on the data of the subset associated with the smallest covariance matrix determinant. Specifically, we implement the Rousseeuw and Van Driessen's (1999) algorithm. When we computed the same indices with the MCD version, we obtained similar results, suggesting that outliers are not driving our factor analysis.
21
Uniqueness of a variable is the share of its variance that is not accounted by all the factors. inherent pressure for the incumbent government to deliver on their promises in order to maximize the possibilities of being re-elected for a new term; that is, the higher the electoral proximity, the lower the consolidation promise gap. The difference between the average size of promise gaps under the high and low values of each principal component seems more important for political Strength and Accountability than for Proximity. 
. Size of Promise Gaps and Political Conditions
Note: "Size" measured in percent of GDP. For details on the three political variables (proximity, strength, accountability) refer to the main text. "High" and "Low" levels are identified by cases above the 75th percentile of the distribution and below the 25th percentile, respectively.
C. Economic and Political Factors: Panel Regressions
To test the role of the above-mentioned economic and political factors simultaneously, we rely on panel regression analyses. We make use of the 229 years of fiscal consolidation in our panel database and estimate the following equation:
where is the consolidation promise gap in country i and year t, is a vector of initial fiscal conditions (measured by the lagged value of public debt-to-GDP ratio) 22 , ′ is a vector of economic conditions (measured by the output gap and the alternative measures of GDP forecast errors), and ′ is a vector of political variables (where we first include each of the principal components -Proximity, Strength and Accountability -and then a selection of political variables from each component ). , , are unknown coefficients to be estimated. is an iid disturbance term satisfying usual assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. Equation (1) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Table 4 reports results for economic determinants and confirm that larger initial debt levels, annual improvements in the output gap and larger forecast errors all lead to smaller consolidation promise gaps. Table 5 adds to the economic determinants the three political indicators computed by Principal
Components Analysis (PCA). We can observe that the most important factors in explaining crosscountry differences in CPGs are political strength and accountability. Table 6 includes a sub-set of relevant political variables for each PCA one at a time and then jointly and shows that they are all associated with lower promise gaps. 23 To ensure that our results are not biased by the decision to combine three datasets that may bring differences in the approaches selected to narrate fiscal developments, we also run our empirical analysis on the original Devries et al. (2011) database and show that even when using a single-source database our main results hold. 24 22 We do not include the sustainability factor because it is collinear with initial levels of debt.
23
From the Proximity PCA we take the months to next elections and build a variable that identifies if an election has taken place recently (i.e.: in the past year); from the Strength PCA we take the margin of majority; and from the Accountability PCA we take the indicator of government effectiveness.
24
In Appendix 2 we repeat the estimation but we constrain the time span to 2009 to match exactly the Devries et al. (2011) sample. Results are qualitatively similar and generally marked by more statistical significance throughout. 
IV. THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONSOLIDATION PROMISE GAPS
The preceding section showed that political factors such as proximity of elections, lack of political strength or low systemic accountability can derail planned fiscal consolidations and increase the size of promise gaps. Policy-makers in such circumstances may be tempted (or forced by surrounding political conditions) to deviate from initial consolidation plans, provided they can compensate for the negative backlash from markets. In order to gauge empirical support to this line of reasoning, we analyse the reactions of financial markets and the electorate to consolidation promise gaps in the next section. We first present some stylized facts and then report the results of regression analysis and impulse-response functions.
A. The Consequences of Consolidation Promise Gaps: Stylized Facts
If we assume that markets and voters expect governments to deliver on their fiscal promises, the analysis of their reaction to promise gaps can be better understood if we split our sample between episodes in which governments over-performed and managed to deliver more consolidation than initially planned, and episodes in which they underperformed and fell short of their promises. Note that in our sample the average size of the promise gaps in underperforming episodes was equivalent to 2.8 percent of GDP, while the average size of the promise gap in over-performing episodes was 1.2 percent of GDP. Figure 7 plots the evolution of government popularity 25 and 5-year bond spreads (against Germany) from four years before the consolidation episode started to four years after. On one hand, government popularity seems to be generally unaffected by the sign of consolidation promise gaps. There is a slight decline in popularity in the aftermath of consolidation episodes in which governments fell short of their promises. Taking this evidence with a grain of salt (because it is not strongly significant), it shows that policy-makers may be mistaken when they assume that they could obtain a boost in popularity by not delivering on their fiscal consolidation plans. While it is possible that in general voters prefer more public goods and dislike fiscal adjustments, it seems that once a promise to consolidate the budget is made they don't like it to be broken. On the other hand, markets seem to react more decisively: government bond spreads increase in both subsamples at the start (and immediately after) of the consolidation, but the spike is larger and more long-lasting in the case of underperforming fiscal adjustments.
Figure 7. Voters' and Market's Reactions to Consolidation Promise Gaps
Note: "over-performance" refers to negative CPG; "underperformance" refers to positive CPG. t is the start of the consolidation episode. The horizontal axis is measured in years. For a definition of "government popularity" refer to footnote 23.
25
"Government popularity" refers to the average percentage of approval/support of the executive leader (president or Prime Minister) per year, or for the EU countries, the percentage of respondents who trust the national government (the EU conducts a survey of its member countries and this is the question that is asked). 
with k=1,…,5 and where Y corresponds to either to the 5-year government bond spreads (relative to Germany) or government popularity; , is the consolidation promise gap variable (in country i at time t); , is the same vector of control variables described in Equation (2); are country fixed effects added to capture unobserved heterogeneity across countries and time-unvarying factors;
are time effects; and are coefficients to be estimated for the lagged dependent variable and set of controls, respectively; , is a disturbance term satisfying usual assumptions; and measures the distributional impact of fiscal consolidation episodes for each future period k. The lag length (l) is set at 2 as selected by the Akaike-Information-Criteria, but our findings are strongly robust to different lag-structures. 27 Equation (2) We are aware of alternative ways of estimating dynamic impacts but, as we explain, those are inferior options. The first possible alternative would be to estimate a Panel Vector Autoregression (PVAR).
However, this is generally considered a "black-box" since all relevant regressors are considered endogenous. Moreover, one has to know the exact order in which they enter in the system. Since economic theory rarely provides such an ordering, the Choleski decomposition is often used as a solution of limited value for providing structural information to a VAR. Moreover, a major limitation of the VAR approach is that it has to be estimated to low order systems. Since all effects of omitted variables are in the residuals, this may lead to big distortions in the IRFs, making them of little use for structural interpretations (see e.g. Hendry 1995) . In addition, all measurement errors or misspecifications also induce unexplained information left in the error terms, making interpretations of the IRFs even more difficult (Ericsson et al., 1997) . One should bear in mind that due to its limited number of variables and the aggregate nature of the shocks, a VAR model should be viewed as an 26 Appendix 3 presents the results of a static approach to test the reaction of markets and voters to positive and negative promise gaps.
27
Results are not shown for reasons of parsimony but are available upon request. 28 The presence of a lagged dependent variable and country fixed effects could bias the estimation of and in small samples (Nickell, 1981) . However, in our case, this is not a problem since the finite sample bias is around 0.03 (that is, 1/T, where T is 38). approximation to a larger structural system. In contrast, the approach used here does not suffer from these identification and size-limitation problems and, in fact, has been suggested by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) , inter alia, as a sufficiently flexible alternative.
A second alternative of assessing the dynamic impact of fiscal consolidation episodes would be to estimate an Autoregressive-Distributed-Lag (ARDL) model of changes in inequality and consolidation episodes and to compute the IRFs from the estimated coefficients (Romer and Romer, 1989; and Cerra and Saxena, 2008) . Note that the IRFs obtained using this method, however, tend to be lagsensitive, therefore undermining the overall stability of the IRFs. Moreover, the statistical significance of long-lasting effects can result from one-type-of-shock models, particularly when the dependent variable is very persistent, as the Gini (Cai and Den Haan, 2009 ). Contrarily, in the local projection method we do not experience such issue since lagged dependent variables enter as control variables and are not used to derive the IRFs. Lastly, estimated IRFs' confidence intervals are computed directly using the standard errors of the estimated coefficients without the need for Monte Carlo simulations.
In order to explore whether the impact of consolidation promise gaps on both markets and the electorate depends on the state of the business cycle, the following alternative regression is estimated:
where z is an indicator of the state of the economy (using the real GDP growth rate) normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. The remainder of the variables and parameters are defined as in Equation (2). This method is equivalent to Granger and Teravistra's (1993) smooth transition autoregressive model, whose advantage relative to estimating VARs for each regime is that it uses a larger number of observations to estimate the IRFs, thus increasing stability and precision. Figure 8 confirms the previous results obtained by estimating equation 2. In the aftermath of a promise gap shock, 5-year government spreads increase strongly and are statistically significant at usual levels. On the contrary, the reaction of voters is weaker. The government popularity declines gradually but the impulse-response function is statistically weaker. Figure 9 shows the results of estimating Equation 3. It seems that markets penalize more incumbent governments (by raising government bond spreads) and for a longer period for not delivering on their promises during bad times. As in Figure 8 , the reaction of voters is not positive, and shows instead a marginally significant decrease in popularity during bad times one year after the promise gap shock. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper analyses the causes and consequences of fiscal consolidation promise gaps, defined as the distance between planned fiscal adjustments and actual consolidations, and finds that these gaps are sizeable; both economic and political factors affect them. In particular, smaller initial debt levels, annual improvements in the output gap and smaller forecast errors narrow promise gaps. The role of political factors in explaining consolidation promise gaps is important: newly elected governments, with a large margin of majority and high government effectiveness are more likely to deliver on their planned fiscal adjustments. Finally, we find evidence that financial markets penalize (reward) underperformers (overperformers), but the electorate is less responsive.
These results have important policy implications. First, policymakers should be more cautious in formulating ambitious fiscal consolidations (especially when they are revenue driven). Second, governments can deliver on their promised spending cuts by improving their capacity to deliver public services efficiently. Also, stronger starting conditions (as reflected by lower fiscal imbalances) could lead to lower promise gaps later on. Finally, policy-makers should not be tempted to deviate from initial adjustment plans hoping to compensate a subsequent market backlash with a boost in popularity because voters do not react positively to broken promises.
Appendix 1. Description of the Sample Selection
The dataset on planned fiscal consolidations used in this paper was constructed combining three sources of data. First we resorted to the Devries et al. (2011) data which covers fiscal consolidation plans in 17 advanced economies between 1978 and 2009. Despite some methodological differences in the selection of planned consolidation episodes, we complemented our sample from 2010 to 2013 using the enlarged narrative dataset of Alesina et al. (2015) . These authors focused on 11 countries (United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) and expanded the narrative dataset until 2013. Finally, for the remaining countries and years, we used the European Commission's Stability and Convergence Programmes (first vintage), complemented with country budget sources to further expand the coverage to 2015.
29
By construction, even if a government has sustained a fiscal adjustment over various years (e.g.UK), the data would be compiled tranches, corresponding to the three sources of data used. Below is a description of the criteria used to expand the database until 2015 using European Commission's data and country sources. Fiscal consolidation in 2010 was motivated by deficit reduction. They key objective of Australia's deficit exit strategy was to limit expenditure growth by introducing a 2 percent cap on annual real public spending growth until the budget returned to a surplus. On the revenue side, the government raised taxes on tobacco and continued implementation of its tax reform agenda. 
Australia
Appendix 2. Robustness of Results in a Homogeneous Sample
By combining three sources of data on narrative fiscal consolidations we face two potential problems. The first one is inherent to the narrative methodology which is itself subjective. While potential (judgemental) measurements errors could have affected the three difference sources of data, we assume that these would be evenly distributed across the three sources because the three data sources followed almost identical criteria for the selection of episodes. The second potential problem arises from possible structural breaks, as a consequence of mixing similar but different data sources between 1978 and 2015. To make sure that the main results are robust, we replicated all the analysis in the homogeneous sample of Devries et al. (2011) which includes data from 17 advanced countries between 1978 and 2009 (see tables A1.1. and A1.2.). We also replicated the analysis using a sample of promise gaps calculated in a sample built only with data from the Stability and Convergence Programs (SCP) submitted by the 28 EU Member States to the European Commission between 1998 and 2015 (see tables A1.3 and A1.4). As shown below, all the results from these tests on two alternative homogeneous samples confirm the robustness of our main findings. Table A3 .1 reports results for the 5-year bond spread reaction to fiscal promise gaps, and confirms that financial markets tend to punish fiscal underperformance. Once governments plan for a fiscal adjustment, markets will follow closely and react negatively when they are not able to meet the targets. Table A3 .2 reports instead the results of using government popularity as the dependent variable. In general, voters do not seem to react strongly to consolidation gaps, regardless of the sign (i.e., whether one inspects under-or overperformers). 
